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There has been much controversy about the treatment of asylum seekers in Australia in recent years,with the Australian Government continuing to enforce a very hard-line stance on asylum seek-
ers who arrive to Australia by boat. The present study examined attitudes towards asylum seekers
using 164 Australian community members during June 2015 by way of questionnaire. Our primary
research question involved how five variables predicted false beliefs about asylum seekers. Specifi-
cally, we measured prejudice, the third-person effect, and confidence in the answers given to false
beliefs about asylum seekers. Regression results indicated that the main predictors of false beliefs were
right-wing political orientation, prejudice, confidence in espousing false beliefs, and the third-person
effect (politicians). Furthermore, most of our community participants accepted a large number of false
beliefs as being true, with approximately two-thirds of our participants scoring above the midpoint.
This reflects similar findings over the last decade or so. Our results indicate that, if one believes in
bottom-up change, a more nuanced approach needs to be undertaken with community anti-prejudice
interventions.
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There has been much controversy about the treatment of
asylum seekers in Australia in recent years, with the Aus-
tralian Government continuing to enforce a very hard-
line stance on asylum seekers who arrive to Australia
by boat. While community sentiment is mixed, with
some Australians feeling compassion for asylum seek-
ers (Surawski, Pedersen, & Briskman, 2008), many Aus-
tralians have highly negative or prejudiced attitudes to-
wards them (Markus, 2015). This is despite the fact that
their arrival by boat does not violate any international or
national law. Indeed, Markus (2015) found that many re-
spondents of a community poll (approximately one-third)
believed asylum-seeker boats should be turned back with-
out asylum claims being assessed. We do not go into great
detail about Australia’s asylum-seeker policies as these can
be found elsewhere (e.g., Fleay, 2010); however, suffice to
say that they are extremely harsh, designed to both deter
and punish asylum seekers who attempt to enter Aus-
tralia by boat (Penovic, 2016). Furthermore, the fact that
Australia’s asylum-seeker policy regime (e.g., mandatory
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detention) is harmful both psychologically and physically
to people seeking asylum cannot be disputed (Coffey,
Kaplan, Sampson, & Tucci, 2010; Davidson, Murray, &
Schweitzer, 2008; Steele et al., 2004). In response to vari-
ous aspects of Australia’s asylum-seeker policy, there has
been considerable outrage from some quarters, includ-
ing the Australian Human Rights Commission (2014).
Relevantly, psychology’s peak body strongly opposes Aus-
tralia’s immigration detention regime (Australian Psycho-
logical Society, 2011a, 2011b).
Because very few Australians have contact with asylum
seekers, it is likely that much of the information that they
receive and espouse comes from commentators and im-
portantly, from politicians via the media (Moloney, 2007).
This information is often inaccurate (Suhnan, Pedersen,
& Hartley, 2012) and leads to what some researchers label
‘false beliefs’ — the acceptance of incorrect information
as being true. This is the focus of the present study: the
examination of why some people accept false beliefs about
asylum seekers as being true and others do not.
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False Beliefs About Asylum Seekers
There is much false information that exists in the public
and political domain about people seeking asylum in Aus-
tralia. For example, Markus (2015) asked an open-ended
question over a number of years regarding the reasons par-
ticipants in his polls believed asylum seekers would make
the journey to Australia by boat. The most common re-
sponse (involving approximately one half of participants)
was to have ‘a better life’ (p. 45), as opposed to fleeing per-
secution. This is in fact not the case; over the last decade,
most asylum seekers to Australia who arrived by boat have
been found to be refugees. There are a number of other
false beliefs; for example, ‘many asylum seekers come to
Australia compared to other Western countries’. This is
incorrect; compared to other OECD countries, Australia
receives comparatively small numbers of asylum seekers,
with the vast majority of the world’s refugees residing in
developing countries (United Nations Higher Commis-
sioner for Refugees, 2013). Another common false be-
lief is that asylum seekers who arrive by boat are ‘illegal’.
However, as a signatory to the United Nations Refugee
Convention (the Refugee Convention) the ‘right to seek
asylum’ regardless of one’s mode of arrival is present in
both Australia’s domestic law and in international law.
Finally, there is a common assumption that ‘asylum seek-
ers are safe when they arrive in Indonesia or Malaysia,
so travelling to Australia is unnecessary’, which in real-
ity is false (Croston & Pedersen, 2013). Unlike Australia,
these countries are not signatories to the Refugee Conven-
tion and as such do not have the legal or administrative
framework to provide for the protection of refugees. Thus,
asylum seekers are considered as ‘undocumented immi-
grants’; they have no access to basic human rights such
as work rights, education, or healthcare, and are con-
stantly vulnerable to being arrested and indefinitely de-
tained by authorities (Mathew & Harley, 2014). Such false
beliefs continue to be a common fixture in the discourse
surrounding asylum seekers (McKay, Thomas, & Knee-
bone, 2012; Sulaiman-Hill, Thompson, Afsar, & Hodliffe,
2011). It is beyond the scope of this article to outline all
false beliefs about asylum seekers to Australia. However,
there are a number of other resources that interested read-
ers can access; for example, Andrew and Renata Kaldor
Centre for International Refugee Law (n.d.), Asylum
Seeker Resource Centre (n.d.), and Buckmaster and Guppy
(2014).
In a recent study, the vast majority of participants
reported a lack of accurate knowledge about asylum seek-
ers and asylum-seeker issues; interestingly, the knowledge
that participants did have corresponded with media re-
porting on the issue (McKay et al., 2012). This brings
us to our next point — the role of the media in the re-
porting of false beliefs. Several studies have found that the
politicians’ rhetoric reported in the media relates to the es-
pousing of false beliefs. For example, Pedersen, Watt, and
Hansen (2006) found that participants who were more
prejudiced against asylum seekers espoused more false
beliefs; furthermore, those beliefs were linked to political
rhetoric (e.g., asylum seekers are queue jumpers, illegals,
and not ‘genuine’ refugees). There has been limited work
conducted on espousing false beliefs, socio-demographic
variables, and political orientation. However, in one Aus-
tralian study, it was found that lower levels of education,
right-wing political position, and increased age corre-
lated with false beliefs (Pedersen, Attwell, & Heveli, 2005).
Right-wing orientation was the strongest variable — the
only one, in fact, to remain significant in a second re-
gression model. False beliefs were also positively corre-
lated with Australian identity. In a recent study, Anderson
(2016) — among other things — found that being male
correlated with both implicit and explicit prejudice to-
wards asylum seekers.
Confidence in Espousing False Beliefs
To date, no research exists linking the acceptance of false
beliefs with confidence in such beliefs in the first place. Pre-
vious research finds that confidence about one’s memory
does not reliably predict accuracy (e.g., Brewer & Weber,
2008; Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000). In another
study, Lawson and Strange (2015) investigated memory
distortions in the media and found that the lower the
accuracy, the higher the level of confidence.
No research exists as to the relationship between false
beliefs about asylum seekers and confidence although it is
safe to say, based on the above, that the relationship is not
a clear one. Specifically, the confidence that individuals
have about their beliefs says nothing about the accuracy
of those beliefs.
Prejudice
The Australian public holds diverse views towards asy-
lum seekers, with some people vehemently supporting
asylum-seeker rights, other people vehemently oppos-
ing asylum-seeker rights, and many people in the mid-
dle. However, prejudice levels, or negativity towards asy-
lum seekers, are relatively high compared with other
marginalised groups like Indigenous Australians (Peder-
sen, Clarke, Dudgeon, & Griffiths, 2005).
The acceptance of false beliefs has been linked with
higher levels of prejudice towards asylum seekers in a num-
ber of studies (e.g., Suhnan et al., 2012). Most regression
studies examining prejudice and false beliefs have been
conducted with prejudice as the dependent variable; how-
ever, it is worth noting that the relationship between preju-
dice and false beliefs is likely to be bidirectional. Prejudiced
people are more likely to accept false negative information
as being true, and being given false negative information
can make people prejudiced. One study that examined
false beliefs as a dependent variable was Pedersen, Attwell
et al. (2005), as discussed previously.
It has been previously argued (e.g., Potter, 1996) that it
is unhelpful to make distinctions between statements that
are ‘true’ and statements that are ‘false’, even though there
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are some statements that are patently untrue; for exam-
ple, ‘There are a lot of asylum seekers coming to Australia
compared with other Western countries’. There are some
statements, however, that require a more nuanced under-
standing of refugee movements and issues that can appear
as though they are open to interpretation, such as ‘Asylum
seekers are queue jumpers’. While such statements require
deeper understanding and discussion to decipher their
inaccuracy, there is uncomplicated agreement that such
statements can be objectively falsified (see Parliament of
Australia, 2015).
Third-Person Effect
Given the small number of asylum seekers who arrive
in Australia by boat compared to the Australian popula-
tion, it is reasonable to assume that most people in the
community do not have any contact with asylum seekers
(Moloney, 2007). Therefore, where does information that
community members hold about asylum seekers origi-
nate? We argue that it is likely that such information
comes from the media and, in particular, from politi-
cians (Every & Augoustinos, 2008). Yet, not everybody
accepts the information that is given to them. So, is there
a media-related, social-psychological process occurring
that might influence people to either accept or reject false
information?
One variable that might affect how much inaccurate
information about asylum seekers is accepted as true is
the ‘third-person effect’ or ‘third-person hypothesis’, as
coined by its founder Davison (1983). As he defined it,
‘in its broadest formulation, this hypothesis predicts that
people will tend to overestimate the influence that mass
communications have on attitudes and behavior of oth-
ers’ (p. 3). A more recent definition, which we rely on,
defines the third-person effect thus: ‘ . . . a tendency for
people to believe that the media have a greater effect on
the beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of other people than
on themselves’ (Duck & Mullin, 1995, pp. 77–78).
As occurs with many concepts, it is clear that context is
important with regard to the third-person effect. It is more
likely to occur when the topic is important to people and
when they perceive the message as being negatively biased
(Perloff, 1993). It has been found to be stronger when
using college samples, possibly because college students
think that they are more intelligent than the average popu-
lation (Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000). It has been found
to be stronger when the targets are perceived as vulnerable
(Sun, Pan, & Shen, 2008). These authors also found that
the effect was strongest with undesirable and/or ambigu-
ous influences (coined ‘the negative-influence corollary’
by Gunther and Storey, 2003, p. 200). The impact of con-
text on the third-person effect has also been addressed
by other authors. For example, Duck and Mullin (1995)
found that the effect is not universal; it depends on me-
dia context (negative, positive, public service campaigns).
They found the effect was stronger in a negative context,
although there was a significant effect for the other two
contexts.
Overview
There are a number of studies examining factors underly-
ing prejudice towards asylum seekers. Past research finds
that a significant correlate of higher levels of prejudice
is the acceptance of false beliefs as being true. There is a
dearth of studies, however, examining what predicts false
beliefs; this is the focus of the present study.
We previously outlined research indicating that many
Australians do not have contact with asylum seekers and
are therefore likely to rely on the media for information.
We also outlined research indicating that message desir-
ability is a moderator of the third-person effect; specif-
ically, the third-person effect is more likely to occur if
the message is perceived as undesirable or negative. Given
that false beliefs about asylum seekers are generally nega-
tive in nature and asylum seekers are seen as undesirable,
it may well be that people who have a tendency to over-
estimate the impact of mass communications on others
might also be more likely to espouse false beliefs. This
line of research is potentially important, given that re-
search finds that people are influenced by what others are
thinking and this can affect intergroup relations (Putra,
2014).
In short, our study adds to the present literature on
the prediction of false beliefs by investigating a num-
ber of variables that have not been linked with this be-
fore. In particular, we investigated the relationship be-
tween false beliefs and confidence in such false beliefs.
We also investigated the relationship between false be-
liefs and the third-person effect (media). This latter re-
search question makes a unique contribution to the third-
person effect literature by including the third-person effect
(politicians).
Specifically, we first examined the third-person effect
that involves the disparity between media messages on
oneself versus others (Liu & Lo, 2014). Based on previous
research (e.g., Duck & Mullin, 1995; Perloff, 1993), we hy-
pothesised that participants would be more likely to report
that other people would be more influenced by (a) politi-
cians and (b) media reporting than themselves. Previous
research has not examined the third-person effect with
regard to asylum-seeker issues, and there is no research
looking at the third-person effect with regard to politi-
cians’ rhetoric. Second, we investigated the correlations
between false beliefs and a number of other independent
variables that might relate to such beliefs. Specifically, we
examined whether the acceptance of false beliefs as be-
ing true related to (a) confidence in holding false beliefs,
(b) prejudice towards asylum seekers, (c) the third-person
effect, both media and politician related, and (d) socio-
demographic and political orientation variables. Finally,
we investigated by way of regression the predictive power
of the social psychological variables outlined above that
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were correlated with false beliefs while controlling for prej-
udice and socio-demographics and political orientation
(previously found relationships).
Our rationale for choosing the variables that we did was
that there are two disparate bodies of literature that may
potentially relate to the acceptance of false information
as being true (confidence and the third-person effect).
We were interested in whether either, or both, bodies of
research were relevant to false beliefs. In essence, we used a




A total of 164 Australian participants were recruited via
Qualtrics, an online community survey pool. Participants
were aged between 20 and 83 years with a median age of
56; this is older than the median age of the Australian pop-
ulation which is 37 (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS],
2014). Approximately half the participants (51%) were
female, which is in line with ABS (2014) statistics. One-
quarter of the participants (25%) had left political lean-
ings compared with just over one-quarter (29%) who had
right political leanings (a full description of political lean-
ings is further described later in this article). Almost half
of the participants (46%) reported that they had neither
left or right leanings. There was a wide spread of partic-
ipant education, with approximately one-quarter (26%)
completing secondary school only and almost a quarter
(23%) had, or were in the process of completing, a bach-
elor degree. The rest did not complete secondary school,
completed or were in the process of completing vocational
training or undergraduate diploma, or they had a higher
degree. Thus, 63% of our participants had part or com-
pleted post-school qualifications. This figure is similar to
the general population; the ABS (2016) found that 59% of
Australians had a post-school qualification.
Most participants were Caucasian/European (83%)
with the rest being Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Is-
lander, Asian, Indian, Middle Eastern, or ‘other’. Almost
half of the sample (48%) was Christian, followed by those
who had no religion (37%). The remainder were Bud-
dhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, or ‘other’. The participants
came from all states in Australia. Most came from Queens-
land (33%), Victoria (24%), and New South Wales (22%).
The remainder came from the Australian Capital Ter-
ritory, South Australia, the Northern Territory, Western
Australia, and Tasmania.
Measures
Demographics. Participants were asked a series of ques-
tions relating to their demographics. Participants stated
their age in years, their gender (1 = female, 2 = male),
their ethnic background (1 = Aboriginal/Torres Strait Is-
lander, 2 = African, 3 = Asian, 4 = Caucasian/European,
5 = Indian, 6 = Middle Eastern, 7 = Pacific Islanders, or
Other), their religion (1 = Buddhist, 2 = Christian, 3 =
Hindu, 4 = Jewish, 5 = Muslim, 6 = no religion, or Other),
education level (1 = Did not complete secondary school
through to 6 = Higher degree) and their political prefer-
ence (1 = strongly left, through to 5 = strongly right, or
6 = don’t care). Specifically, they were asked: ‘How would
you describe your political preferences on most issues?
Please tick one box that comes closest to your view. “Right
or right-wing” views mean a conservative political view-
point; and “Left or left-wing” means the opposite.’ They
also reported which state they lived in.
We then explained what an asylum seeker was for the
purposes of our study: ‘An asylum seeker is someone who
is seeking international protection but whose claim for
refugee status has not yet been determined. There are also
asylum seekers who arrive by plane but we are only looking
at those who try to arrive by boat in this study.’
Third-person questions. Two questions based on Liu and
Lo (2014) were asked with regard to the influence of the
news and politicians respectively (making a total of four
questions). The first was ‘To what degree does news cov-
erage inform your views on asylum seekers?’ The second
was ‘To what degree does news coverage inform the views
of other Australians on asylum seekers?’ The third was
‘To what degree does what you hear from politicians in-
form your views on asylum seekers?’ The fourth was ‘To
what degree does what you hear from politicians inform
the views of other Australians on asylum seekers?’ Partici-
pants answered on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 being not
at all and 7 being very much. To create the third-person
variables, we subtracted ‘the effect of self’ from’ the effect
of others’ as per Liu and Lo (2014) and Robinson and
Umphrey (2006). Thus, the analysis involved an analysis
of two scores: third-person effect news and third-person
effect politicians.
False beliefs. Ten questions based on Croston and Peder-
sen (2012) were then asked of participants; for example,
‘Asylum seekers are safe when they arrive in Indonesia or
Malaysia so travelling to Australia is unnecessary.’ Partic-
ipants answered on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 being
strongly disagree and 7 being strongly agree. Three items
were reversed so that high scores equalled high belief in
false beliefs. Croston and Pedersen found that reliability
for the scale was satisfactory (α = 0.88).
Confidence in false beliefs. After the false belief questions,
participants were asked how confident they were about
the answers they just gave. There was one question: ‘How
confident of your answers to the above 10 questions are
you?’ Participants answered on a 7-point Likert scale, with
1 being not at all confident and 7 being very confident.
Prejudice. This six-item, semantic-differential scale,
adapted from Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, and Ropp
(1997), was used to measure prejudice towards asylum
seekers. Participants indicated on a Likert scale ranging
from 0 to 10 how they felt about asylum seekers with
six paired adjectives; for example, ‘negative-positive’, with
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higher scores indicating higher prejudice. Previous re-
search finds this prejudice scale reliable; for example,
Turoy-Smith, Kane, and Pedersen (2013), with α = .93
with respect to refugees in Australia.
First, we did a pilot study to test the questionnaire
using a convenience sample. The total sample involved
69 participants; minor changes were made to the ques-
tionnaire after such piloting to make the questions more
understandable to the general public.
For the study proper, participants were drawn from
around Australia during June 2015 through Qualtrics, an
online community survey service. Participants were sent
an email regarding the topic of the study and could ei-
ther complete the questionnaire or not. All participants
were given the same questionnaire with the measures in
this order: socio-demographics, third-person questions,
the false belief scale, and confidence in false beliefs and




One item in the false belief scale (i.e., Giving Temporary
Protection Visas will not stop the boats) lowered reliability
and was therefore removed, leaving a total of nine items.
However, no other item needed to be removed from any
of the scales. As set out in Table 1, we found that reli-
ability was satisfactory for all three scales (between α =
.71 and α = .95). With respect to our dependent variable,
we note that many participants held some false beliefs
about asylum seekers, with the mean being 4.61; indeed,
most scored above the midpoint. While a minority of par-
ticipants (25%) scored below the midpoint, 7.3% scored
on the midpoint and the remaining two-thirds (67.7%)
scored above the midpoint. Interestingly, participants were
relatively confident about their answers regarding false be-
liefs, with most participants scoring high on this variable.
The participants scored above the midpoint on the prej-
udice scale, and there was a greater discrepancy between
extreme scores with the third-person effect (politician)
compared with the third-person effect (media).
Aim 1: The Third-Person Effect
We hypothesised that participants would be more likely to
report that other people would be more influenced by (a)
politicians and (b) media reporting than themselves. First,
we investigated whether participants would be more likely
to report that other people would be more likely to be
influenced by news media reporting than themselves. Re-
sults indicated no significant third-person effect, t(163) =
1.8, p = .074. Second, we investigated whether participants
would be more likely to report that other people would be
more likely to be influenced by politicians’ rhetoric than
themselves. Results indicated a significant third-person ef-
fect, t(163) = 4.0, p < .001). This effect can be described as
small at r = .10 (see Cohen, 1988). In other words, partic-
ipants were significantly more likely to report that other
people would be influenced by politicians than themselves.
Aim 2: Correlations Between Variables
First, we look at the correlation matrix. As can be seen in
Table 2, there was a large relationship between false beliefs
and prejudice towards asylum seekers. There was a mod-
erate relationship between false beliefs and confidence in
holding such false beliefs and right-wing political views.
There was a small but significant negative correlation with
regard to the third-person effect (politicians) as well as all
socio-demographics. That is, people who scored high on
false beliefs were less likely to believe that politicians had a
bigger effect on other people compared with people who
scored low on false beliefs. They were also more likely to
be older males with lower levels of education.
Aim 3: Prediction of False Beliefs
We then investigated by way of multiple regression the
predictive power of the social-psychological variables out-
lined above while controlling for socio-demographics,
political orientation, and prejudice. We controlled for
prejudice because of the well-established relationship be-
tween prejudice and false beliefs, and controlled for socio-
demographics and political orientation because this re-
lationship has been investigated before (Pedersen et al.,
2004), and it is sometimes useful to compare similar stud-
ies. The new social-psychological variables were of more
interest to us than previously found relationships.
In first regression model, prejudice and the socio-
demographic variables accounted for a significant 39.7%
of variance; however, only prejudice and political orien-
tation were significant when all variables were included
(R2 change = .397; see Table 3). This indicated that people
who scored high on false beliefs also scored high on prej-
udice and were more likely to support right-wing politics.
When all the social-psychological variables were added
in the second regression model, the amount of variance
accounted for significantly increased by 4.3%, indicat-
ing that people who scored high on false beliefs were
again more likely to score high on prejudice and be right
wing politically (R2 change = .439). They were also more
likely be confident in their answers to the false beliefs
and were more likely to be believe that others were more
susceptible to being influenced by politicians than them-
selves (the third-person effect). Overall, the final model
accounted for a significant 43.9% of variance, which ac-
cording to Cohen (1988) can be considered a large effect
size.
Discussion
In the present study, we were interested in what would
predict false beliefs about asylum seekers in Australia us-
ing two different theoretical concepts: confidence in one’s
opinion and the third-person effect. We found mod-
est support for the third-person effect (politicians) and
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Predictor Variables
M (SD) Range Reliability Number of items
False beliefs 4.61 (1.20) 1.22–6.89  = .85 9
Confidence in false beliefs 5.65 (1.24) 2–7 — 1
Prejudice 6.32 (2.34) 1.17–11  = .95 6
Third-person effect media 0.159 (1.13) − .3.00–4.00 — 2
Third-person effect politicians 0.329 (1.16) − 3.00–5.00 — 2
Table 2
Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. False beliefs 1 .319∗∗ .529∗∗ − .063 − .181∗ .453∗∗ − .161∗ .187∗ − .188∗
[.171, [.366, [ − .221, [ − .345, [.325, [ − .307, [.028, [ − .331,
.459] .685] .093] − .029] .571] .004] .347] − .034]
2. Confidence in false
beliefs
1 .311∗∗ − .047 .015 .143 .014 .210∗∗ − .125
[.171, [ − .195, [ − .130, [.020, [ − .136, [ − .277,
.456] .091] .157] .269] .153] [.067, .347] .030]
3. Prejudice 1 − .027 − .043 .255∗ − .173∗ .195∗ − .086
[ − .168, [ − .194, [.107, [.045, [ − .248,
.126] .120] .396] [ − .317, −.032] .336] .064]
4. Third-person effect
news
1 .280∗∗ − .013 − .011 − .059 − .056
− .002, .548] [ − .170, .188] [ − .171, .146] [ − .206, .096] [ − .210, .091]
5. Third-person effect
politicians
1 .038 .148 − .058 − .062
[ − .247, .147] .026, .278] [ − .206, .078] [ − .204, .102]
6. Political position 1 − .098 .166∗ − .219∗∗
[ − .252, [.019,
.068] .297] [ − .354, −.068]
7. Education 1 − .168∗ − .023
[ − .302, −.022] [ − .177, .136]
8. Age 1 − .268∗∗
[ − .400, −.110]
9. Gender 1
Note: Confidence intervals and standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap samples. Most relevant significant relationships are shown in bold type for ease of reference.
confidence in the multiple regression analysis. We will
discuss these findings in full below, together with the prac-
tical implications and conclusions of our study. But first,
it is worth noting that the acceptance of false information
about asylum seekers was quite prevalent in this com-
munity sample, with most participants (approximately
two-thirds) scoring above the midpoint of the scale. Thus,
our view of the importance of investigating false beliefs is
iterated.
The Third-Person Effect
The second analysis we conducted involved the third-
person effect; our prediction that participants would be
more likely to report that other people would be more
influenced by (a) politicians and (b) media reporting than
themselves was only partially supported. There was a sig-
nificant (but small) effect with respect to the questions
relating to politicians but no significant effect with re-
spect to the media generally. This lack of effect might be
due to the fact that — depending on the media outlet
one is predominately engaging with — not all media is
negative about asylum seekers (see Cooper, Olejniczak,
Lenette, & Smedley, 2016; Gordon, 2015; Mitchell, 2015).
Future research might seek to separate out the media out-
let to see whether this has an impact on the third-person
effect. Also, some research finds (in particular, Paul et al.,
2000) that the third-person effect is weaker in community
samples compared with student samples, and ours was a
community sample. The fact that there was no effect for
third-person effect (news) and only a small effect for third-
person effect (politicians) could be considered surprising
given the topic matter. Duck and Mullin’s (1995) study
found that the third-person effect was more pronounced
when participants considered the impact of negative con-
tent such as racism because of self-serving motivations.
Yet, it is very likely that our more negative participants
would not see their attitudes as racist; most people do not
(see Dunn, Forrest, Burnley, & McDonald, 2004).
The fact that the politician third-person effect was
significant and the media third-person effect was not
can only be speculated on. However, it may relate to
some recent findings in the United States that news
sources were trusted more than other sources even though
negativity about news sources was at an all-time high (Pew
Research Center, 2011). So, it may be that a similar situa-
tion occurs in Australia, where politicians are trusted less
than the news generally. Indeed, recent research indicates
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Table 3
Multiple Regression Predicting False Beliefs From Independent Variables.
Variables entered b SE b Beta p
First model
(Constant) 2.338 .574 p = .001
[1.185, 3.436]
Age .002 .006 .021 p = .753
[ − .009, .013]
Sex − .185 .158 − .077 p = .264
[ − .489, .141]
Political preference .401 .101 .319 p = .002
[.188, .583]
Education − .042 .052 − .054 p = .431
[ − .143, .058]
Prejudice .219 .044 .427 p = .001
[.135, .308]
Second model (Constant) 1.907 .645 p = .005
[.706, 3.128]
Age − .001 .006 − .010 p = .872
[ − .012, .010]
Sex − .198 .158 − .083 p = .223
[ − .419, .110]
Political preference .387 .097 .307 p = .002
[.193, .567]
Education − .037 .052 − .048 p = .479
[ − .136, .062]
Prejudice .197 .045 .383 p = .001
[.111, .290]
Third-person effect: Politics − .170 .081 − .150 p = .032
[ − .348, −.039]
Third-person Effect News − .014 .068 − .013 p = .828
[ − .135, .122]
Confidence in myths .145 .065 .150 p = .034
[ − .013, .271]
Note: Confidence intervals reported in parentheses. Confidence intervals and standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap samples.
R2 = .397 after the first model; R2 = .439 after the second model. Significant relationships are shown in bold type for ease of reference.
that a very small minority of Australians — 5% — trust
the government (Evans, Stoker, & Halupka, 2016). Future
research is needed to explore this possible explanation
further.
Relationship Between False Beliefs and the Independent
Variables
Our next analysis investigated the correlations between
false beliefs and a number of other variables relating to
such beliefs (confidence in false beliefs; prejudice; the
third-person effect, both media and politician; socio-
demographic variables; and political orientation).
With regard to the socio-demographics and political
orientation, we found that participants who scored high
on false beliefs tended to be older with low levels of
education, and who leaned towards the political right
(in line with Pedersen, Attwell et al., 2005). They also
tended to be males, in line with Anderson (2016). Thus,
there were similarities in the relationship between false
beliefs and socio-demographic variables with previous
work.
False beliefs were also correlated with confidence in
false beliefs, prejudice, and the third-person effect (politi-
cians). These three variables were also significant in the
regression, which we will now turn to.
Prejudice significantly predicted the acceptance of false
information as being true. This is not surprising given the
amount of research finding such a link (e.g., Suhnan et al.,
2012). As noted previously, this is likely to be a bidirec-
tional relationship; future research should thus attempt to
disentangle the direction of these variables.
Confidence in false beliefs significantly predicted the ac-
ceptance of those false beliefs as being true. Interestingly,
participants were generally quite confident about their
answers regarding the false belief scale, with most partic-
ipants scoring above the midpoint. Our study supports
other research that finds that confidence does not mean
increased accuracy (Brewer & Weber, 2008). However, the
present research takes these findings further in the context
of asylum seekers, finding that the more confident peo-
ple feel about their false beliefs, the more life is given to
them — they are more likely to espouse them. Our re-
sults support the findings of Lawson and Strange (2015),
who investigated memory distortions in the media. Like
us, they found that the lower the memory accuracy, the
higher the level of participants’ confidence levels. In other
words, participants who were more confident were less
accurate.
Third-person effect (politicians) also significantly pre-
dicted false beliefs. Contrary to expectation, the more
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people espoused false beliefs, the less they reported be-
ing affected by the third-person effect. So, they did not
believe that politicians had more of an effect on others
compared to themselves. A different way of reading the
same results is that the less people espoused false beliefs,
the more they believed that others would be more likely
to be influenced by politicians. So, they might perceive
that the less accurate participants would see the politi-
cal rhetoric about asylum seekers as ‘the truth’ and are
fine with accepting that politicians ‘inform their views on
asylum seekers’ as the questionnaire item states.
At the same time, it might be that the more knowledge-
able participants are getting their information from more
legitimate sources. For example, participants who scored
relatively low on false beliefs could read well-publicised
books such as Dark Victory (Marr & Wilkinson, 2003)
or Human Rights Overboard (Briskman, Latham, & God-
dard, 2008). They could also be reading myth-busting sites
(e.g., Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, n.d.) or any num-
ber of journal articles. Thus, they may be more likely to
think that they are not affected by politicians’ rhetoric
while others are indeed affected. Again, further research is
necessary to address this hypothesis directly.
Practical Implications
From a theoretical viewpoint, our research indicates that
two disparate bodies of research (confidence in one’s opin-
ions and the third-person effect) are both relevant to the
acceptance of false beliefs being true. However, there are
also practical implications arising from our article. The
first is the degree of false beliefs espoused by many partic-
ipants and the fact that they are reinforced by the media
and politicians (see Every & Augoustinos, 2008). In one
study, it was found that if you consistently hear something,
false or otherwise, you are much more likely to remember
it (Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005). In the Skurnik
et al. (2005) study, participants were told that informa-
tion was false. In the short term, they remembered this
correctly. But over time, participants — in particular, the
older ones — remembered the information incorrectly;
that is, they remembered the false information. With most
of our participants, it is not likely that they were told that
the information that they held was false by politicians or
the media; or if they were told, they may not accept it. As
found by Croston and Pedersen (2013), participants who
initially disagreed with an article correcting false beliefs re-
called less accurate information. This is in line with what is
known as ‘confirmation bias’, which is the well-established
tendency to interpret information in line with one’s own
previous views (Nickerson, 1998). The role of memory
distortion is well documented (see Bigler & Liben, 1993;
Frawley, 2008). As Schacter (2012) puts it, memories are
critical to engage with our world, but they are also prone
to distortion. Thus, he argues, our memories are both
adaptive yet have considerable pitfalls. In another study,
it was found that when children were repeatedly given in-
formation about an event that did not occur, they were
more likely to report this event as being true at a later date
compared with children who were given less information
(Otgaar, Smeets, & Peters, 2012). Many of the false beliefs
about asylum seekers are in fact repeatedly given by Aus-
tralian politicians through the media (e.g., ‘genuineness’
of asylum seekers’ claims).
The second issue is the finding that right-wing po-
litical orientation significantly predicted false beliefs; this
has ramifications for people who design and implement
interventions to address prejudice. It is difficult to run
campaigns in this field without mentioning politicians
and political policy, given the relationship between politi-
cians’ rhetoric and the acceptance of false information as
being true (Pedersen et al., 2006). We would suggest that
antiprejudice strategists think carefully about how this
should be done; the very people that they might be trying
to influence might be so offended that they stop listening.
We are not suggesting that the subject be avoided; we are
simply suggesting that a nuanced approach should be used
in discussing the topic.
The third issue is the confidence that people have in
false beliefs. People who are more likely to espouse false be-
liefs have more confidence in them. This, coupled with the
preceding findings, means that — again — those working
to address negativity towards asylum seekers need to tread
gently when dealing with these false beliefs. The fact that
many community members are likely to have confidence
in their beliefs means that it will take sensitive work to
have them consider beliefs based on evidence that par-
ticipants are likely not to have considered. Simply saying
to people that they are wrong or that they hold incorrect
information is unlikely to sway their opinion. We pro-
pose that a more effective way is to discuss these issues
calmly, using a number of sources; furthermore, it may be
that they need to go away and check these sources them-
selves. If giving an antiprejudice workshop, it would also
be better to have a number of speakers giving information.
Indeed, there are a number of organisations that conduct
interventions aimed at increasing positivity and decreas-
ing false beliefs, and they often use multiple speakers with
a pro-asylum seeker focus. For example, both of the au-
thors in the present study were involved in a community-
education program that included a breakfast-information
session with a number of speakers: an asylum seeker, a
human rights lawyer, and a social psychologist. Imparting
factual information was an important part of this event,
and it was delivered from a number of sources.
However, it is worth noting that disputing false beliefs
is only part of the picture (albeit an important one) when
engaging in an antiprejudice strategy. There are other im-
portant factors that need to be taken into account (see
Pedersen & Hartley, 2015, for an overview of these). In
particular, we note that what we see as ‘rational commu-
nication’ is unlikely to be enough to sway both politi-
cians and the general public. One only has to look at the
U.S. politics to see the comment by Kellyanne Conway
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(President Trump’s aide) that the media distorts reality
and that there were ‘alternative facts’ (see Wood, 2017). It
has been further argued that there is political mileage to
be had from scapegoating asylum seekers (Marr & Wilkin-
son, 2003); thus, anti-asylum seeker rhetoric can be seen
to be functional. We do not argue that facts alone will
change policy. Instead, facts are part of the picture but a
very necessary one. As has been shown in recent years,
politicians do not always ‘toe the party line’ and this has
led to policy change. This issue aside, the more confi-
dent people are regarding their views, the more skill is
needed to counter them, and this needs to be taken into
account.
The final issue we would like to discuss is the third-
person effect findings. Participants who accepted false in-
formation as being true were less likely to believe that
politicians have more of an effect on other people’s views
compared to their own views. This might be due to the
high false-belief participants seeing the political rhetoric
about asylum seekers as ‘the truth’, thus diminishing the
third-person effect with an expectation that most right-
thinking individuals will accept it. Alternatively, it might
be that the finding is led by low false-belief participants
who were less likely to accept the false beliefs. Only fu-
ture research can untangle this question. Regardless of
the direction of the relationship, we suggest that in an
antiprejudice intervention, a full, frank and diplomatic
discussion about the role of political rhetoric needs to be
held.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research
There were a number of limitations relating to the present
study. The first is that although we had hoped for a repre-
sentative sample, our participants were generally older
Australians with an average age of 54. Given that the
present study found that increased age related to false
beliefs, it might be that a younger sample might react
differently to the questions asked. Also, the third-person
effect questions were quite general, so it would be inter-
esting to break them up into different types of media and
political party. It would be interesting to follow this up:
Does political rhetoric seem desirable or positive by some
participants and, if so, does this relate to the third-person
effect?
However, there were also strengths to our research. Al-
though our sample was older than the general population,
it was generally a good representation of the Australian
population with respect to gender and education (ABS,
2014, 2016). It was also the only research apart from Ped-
ersen, Attwell et al. (2005) to investigate false beliefs as
a dependent variable; unfortunately, we found that 10
years after this study, a great deal of false information
still exists. It is also the first study to look at the rela-
tionship between false beliefs, confidence in such myths,
and prejudice. Furthermore, no research has examined
the third-person effect with regard to asylum-seeker is-
sues or the third-person effect with regard to politicians’
rhetoric.
Conclusion
The prevalence of false beliefs in the community is a prob-
lem for the smooth functioning of Australian society as it
leads to disquiet and resentment that then affects asylum-
seeker and refugee communities. This resentment against
asylum seekers, based on inaccurate information, is un-
necessary although functional in some respects (we deal
with this later in this article). We have also shown in our
article that people who espouse false beliefs are more con-
fident in their views; this has implications for antiprejudice
strategists trying to reduce such false beliefs. With regard
to the third-person findings, we add to previous research
that finds that such beliefs must be viewed within the con-
text in which they arise. More research is necessary on this
point.
It is also worth noting that although there is some
positive asylum-seeker media, a great deal is negative (see,
e.g., Moloney, 2007, with respect to politically satirical car-
toons). The two major political parties prioritise policies
aimed at deterring asylum seekers from getting on boats
and emphasise the role of people smugglers in this process;
in so doing, the humanity of asylum seekers is diminished.
This results in most politicians’ rhetoric influencing many
Australians to feel threatened by asylum seekers (Suhnan
et al., 2012). However, this does not mean that antipreju-
dice strategists and advocates should give up. We need to
change the system from the bottom up and that is where
the use of valid research is important — so we know how
to do it. For example, in a recent Australian study, Ander-
son, Stuart, and Rossen (2015) found that macro justice
principles (i.e., principles involving equal resource distri-
bution) predicted positivity towards asylum seekers. We
need to work with researchers, advocates and organisa-
tions to make societal change. As found in 2005 when a
number of Australian Liberal Party MPs (known as the
‘Rebels’) spoke out against their leader (John Howard)
about the deleterious conditions of mandatory detention
after consistent lobbying by constituents, the giving of in-
formation to politicians can influence policy. However, it
needs to be done in a way where they will actually listen.
This is where research can be influential. In short, doing
nothing is simply not an option, and we hope that our
research can help — even if in a very small way — to
achieve this.
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Endnote
1 We note that we were also interested in the relationship
between exposure of media and false beliefs (we measured
newspaper, television, the internet, and radio). However,
as there was no effect, we did not include this aspect in the
main study but note the results in an effort not to add to
the ‘file drawer problem’.
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